Speaker
Description
The rise in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and pollution since the 1960s is causing a global climate crisis. Some parts of the world have stepped up their efforts to transition from carbon-based to renewable energy sources in the last decade(s). While the use of renewable energy sources is increasing, GHG emissions are reaching record highs with no evidence that they have peaked. Similarly, transport is responsible for around one-sixth of global fossil fuel emissions and is experiencing exponential growth in many, but not all, parts of the world. Electric vehicles (EVs) are considered the key technology for decarbonising road transport. Their production and sales are also increasing in many, but not all, parts of the world.
The EU has a number of acts and documents guiding the EU's energy transition and the functioning of the internal market, e.g. the Critical Raw Materials Act. The EU laws defend the interests of its citizens and ensure that all potentially affected stakeholders have a say in the process (European Commission, 2023a; 2023b). In addition, the EU's Territorial Agenda 2030 calls for strengthening the territorial dimension of sectoral policies and aims to promote an inclusive and sustainable future for all places.
What are the contradictions of planning “just energy transition” in the EU?
First and foremost, no territorial entity controls its climate. Lower GHG emissions and improved environmental conditions only in the EU will not stabilise its climate. Secondly, Fressoz (2024) claims that there is no energy transition. The primary energy sources do not replace each other. Rather, they fuel each other's exploitation, along with the exploitation of raw materials, especially under the imperative of competitive, uninterrupted economic growth. While some countries are deploying more EVs and managing to reduce GHG emissions, the production of EVs pollutes areas where the needed raw materials are extracted. Moreover, the EU considers justice for stakeholders only within its borders.
Where are these contradictions manifested?
The protracted EU integration process has turned the Western Balkans countries into EU candidates but also stabilitocracies. Stabilitocracy in Serbia means that the country is ruled by a (semi-)authoritarian regime supported by the EU. The regime can ensure a certain degree of regional stability and fulfil the interests of powerful foreign governments while deteriorating internal democracy and increasing its wealth. Lithium, which is (currently) the main material in EV batteries, is on the EU “critical raw material” list, and while its presence has been identified in several EU countries (most notably Germany), the Serbian agricultural and biodiverse region, Jadar has been chosen by the company Rio Tinto for its exploitation. At that moment, Jadar became a “sacrifice zone” of the EU “just energy transition”. Moreover, spatial planning for lithium mining has since been an instrument to legitimise the ruling party’s narrative of unimaginable national economic growth, for Rio Tinto’s interest to profit from lithium exploitation, the interest of the German “green” EV industry to get cheap lithium while restricting its access to the Chinese EV industry, and the interest of EU citizens to feel climate-friendly while driving EU-made EVs.
In Serbia, this “sacrifice” and the proven negative effects of lithium mining have provoked the resistance of the local stakeholders, who are supported by the majority of the people in Serbia. Questions for this occasion are: If the EU continues to plan its “just energy transition” under these conditions, are citizens and planners from the EU agreeing to permanently ruin the environment and wellbeing of people outside the EU? Are the borders of the EU states the true boundaries of its citizens' and planners’ dignity and sense of spatial justice?
References
European Commission, 2023a. Critical raw materials. [online] single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu. Available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en#critical-raw-materials-act [Accessed 21 Feb. 2025].
European Commission, 2023b. The Green Deal Industrial Plan. [online] commission.europa.eu. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en [Accessed 25 Feb. 2025].
Global Carbon Budget, 2024. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions increase again in 2024. [online] Global Carbon Budget. Available at: https://globalcarbonbudget.org/fossil-fuel-co2-emissions-increase-again-in-2024/ [Accessed 25 Feb. 2025].
Informal meeting of Ministers responsible for spatial planning, territorial development and/or territorial cohesion, 2020. Territorial Agenda 2030. Available at: https://territorialagenda.eu/wp-content/uploads/TA2030_jun2021_en.pdf. [Accessed 25 Feb. 2025]
International Energy Agency, 2024a. Electric vehicles. [online] IEA. Available at: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/transport/electric-vehicles [Accessed 25 Feb. 2025].
International Energy Agency, 2024b. Global EV Outlook 2024. [online] IEA. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024. [Accessed 25 Feb. 2025].
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, 2024. Sans Transition, Une nouvelle histoire de l’energie. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
| Keywords | electrical vehicles; critical raw materials; contradictions; borders; EU; Serbia. |
|---|---|
| Best Congress Paper Award | No |
